Ethics as Self-Transcendence:
Legal Education, Faith, and an Ethos of Justice
Patrick Brown, I D . , P h D !
Lord, if I argued my case with you, you would prove to be right.
Yet I must question you about matters of justice. Why are wicked
men so prosperous? Why do dishonest men succeed?
Jeremiah 12:1 I
CALLICLES: I f you are serious and what you say is true, we shall
have human life turned completely upside down; we are doing, apparently, the complete opposite of what we ought.
PLATO, GORGIAS
2
I. INTRODUCTION

This conference concerns "pluralism, religion, and the law," and
within that overarching theme members of this panel have been asked to
speak on some aspect of "ethics, professionalism, and the practice o f
law." I want to use this opportunity to reflect on an aspect of ethics that
is at once basic, far-reaching, and deeply neglected: ethics considered
precisely as the theory and practice of self-transcendence.
Ethics as self-transcendence is basic because it underlies all the various branches of ethics. I t is far-reaching because it has implications not
only for personal ethics but also for professional ethics and, indeed, for
the very conditions of legal practice. I t is neglected because legal academics generally lack any serious background or training in philosophy.
As a result, the legal-academic discussion of legal ethics tends to mistake
what is obvious in ethics for what ethics obviously is. I t tends to think
I Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, Seattle University School of Law.
1. For an exquisite treatment of this passage and its broader context, see RON HANSEN, Affliction and Grace: Religious Experience in the Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, in A STAY AGAINST
CONFUSION:ESSAYS ON FAITH AND FICTION 115, 115-34 (HarperCollins 2001), especially pages
130-34. See also infra note 11 and the context intimated there.
2. PLATO, GORGIAS *481 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 1960).
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that the essence of ethics is some form of formalism, that is, some judicious combination of easily apprehended concepts and readily enforceable rules. Wh ile such formalism may represent the external form of
some varieties of ethics, it is hardly the inner core of ethics, and it is
hardly the best vehicle for professional formation or for fostering a
commitment to justice.
My thesis, then, is simple and, I trust, audacious. Ethics is fundamentally about ethos, attitude, one's grounded stance or existential orientation, not the extrinsicism of concepts or the formalism of rules. Ethics
concerns not just any orientation, but that intimate and demanding form
of personal development manifested in the experience and practice o f
self-transcendence. Conv er s ely , t h e neglect o f ethics a s s elftranscendence introduces deep distortions into the way we socialize students into notions of ethics and professionalism. I t introduces subsequent distortions into the conditions of legal practice. I t encourages a
superficial and extrinsic minimalism. I t encourages, in effect, the disastrous conception of legal ethics as ethical legalism.
The sources of these distortions are complex, and I cannot hope to
explore them fully here. But I hope to explore, briefly and suggestively,
the notion of ethics as self-transcendence and its relation to the spontaneous human quest for happiness, to religious faith, and to fostering an
ethos of justice. I begin by considering the role of what I take to be the
standard model of legal pedagogy in engendering and perpetuating certain distortions concerning objectivity, value, and the good. I then describe and explore a basic, non-minimalist, and non-formalist notion of
ethics centering on the notions o f orientation, self-transcendence, and
self-constitution; such a view of ethics might serve as a counterpoise to
some of the defective notions implicit in the standard model of legal pedagogy. Next, I describe a heuristic model of four levels of happiness,
which adds dialectical nuances to the basic account of ethics. I conclude
with some brief reflections on the role of faith in promoting an ethos of
justice.
LEGAL PEDAGOGYAND A CRISISOFTHEPROFESSION?
I want to speak first about a tension within the standard model of
legal pedagogy. I n important ways, legal education operates at crosspurposes with itself. O n the one hand, it likes to think of itself as a sublime embodiment of critical and skeptical rationality, heir to Socrates
himself and his spirit of restless and probing inquiry. O n the other hand,
legal education likes to think of itself as an active promoter of important
objective values like honesty, integrity, professionalism, perhaps even
something called justice. O n the one hand, legal education sees itself as
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serving an end beyond mere practicality. On the other hand, legal education is relentlessly instrumental. L e g a l education prides itself on its
skepticism, yet it is incompletely skeptical, for it is skeptical of everything but its own skepticism. Legal education prides itself on its civicmindedness and professionalism, yet it is incompletely civic-minded and
professional, for its undifferentiated skepticism leaves its students no
grounds for affirming important objective civic and professional values.
I will say more about this apparent schizophrenia in a moment. For
now, I simply want to note that it subtly affects or afflicts the ethos of the
legal academy and the atmosphere of law school. I t impacts our received
notions of professionalism, ethics, and their relation to the practice of
law. And it even affects our ethos of justice, which is either formed, deformed, or left culpably unformed by the professional womb we call law
school. O ur notions of professionalism and ethics within the practice of
law do not spring into being ex nihilo; they are formed (and, I will argue,
also partly deformed) when we are socialized and acculturated into the
law as law students.
This tension remains generally unnoticed, even in the rest of the
academic world. The view from the outside is that, of course, law school
is centrally concerned with justice. My colleagues in the philosophy and
theology departments at Seattle University are generally amazed when I
tell them that law school is not a three-year program of studies about justice. N o t ever having been to law school, they quite naturally believe
that law is about justice, and so, of course, law school must be a long
training in thinking rigorously about the nature and practice of justice.
When I tell them that law school is mainly about technical training in
matters such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of contracts,
torts, civil procedure, bankruptcy, land use, administrative law, and so
on, they are mildly surprised. When I tell them that "justice" is rarely
even mentioned in most law school courses, they are openly incredulous.
When I tell them that ethics in the law, taught under the rubric of "Professional Responsibility," is mainly about learning the minimal rules one
needs to observe in order to avoid being disbarred, they are simply
stunned. Surely, an ethics curriculum in a discipline such as law, which
is so central to our social, cultural, and political systems, might aim
higher than merely communicating to students such profound and nonobvious ethical precepts as "thou shalt not sleep with thy clients" and
"thou shalt not commingle thy clients' and thine own checking accounts."
Professional responsibility courses and precepts are perfectly necessary, of course, but are they sufficient? Does an implicit or explicit
ethical minimalism get things upside down? Even if it did, what would
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be the alternative? Theoretical ethics is as contested and conflicted a
zone as any other area in the modern academy. I s running students
through the whole gamut of conflicting opinions in theoretical ethics the
only alternative to a rules-based minimalism? The question is an important one. As anyone familiar with the contemporary conditions of legal
practice will tell you—and this claim will resonate with you far more if
you have practiced law in a large firm within the last ten or fifteen
years—"we are doing, apparently, the complete opposite o f what we
ought."
Indeed, I sometimes suspect that if my colleagues outside the law
school were fully informed on what happens in law school and contemporary legal practice, they might be tempted to exclaim with Henry Adams, when he was reflecting on his education at Harvard, that "the chief
wonder of education is that it does not ruin everybody concerned in it,
teachers and taught."
here
3 is that law school pedagogy is not neutral; it is not 'value free' in
the
sense
W h
a t of
e the
v eterm
r often attributed to Max Weber, and we should stop
pretending
that
it
is. H o w legal education is structured has important
t
h
e
implications
for
what
counts as "ethical" in legal practice, and it has
m e r i t
enormous
implications concerning the survival of the ideal o f "profess
sionalism"
o
f in the practice of law!' Beyond that, it has implications for
the survival of idealism and religious faith as sources of ethical orientat
h
a
tion and praxis within legal practice.
t
Despite its aspirations to neutrality and objectivity—or perhaps
vprecisely
i because
e
of them—law school is a carrier of values, an enviw
,
ronmental or professional womb from which emerge the legal worldm
views of its students. But law school pedagogy is not neutral and it canynot be neutral. I t may be "objective," but only if one naïvely misunderm
a
stands
objectivity
to exclude subjectivity, that is, the actual operations of
i minds,n the actual aspirations of our spirits (if I may dare to use such a
our
p
word
within
o the hallowed, or perhaps hollowed, halls of the legal academy).
i
n
Whatever else it may also be, law school is the actual formative
t
process through which law students are inducted willy-nilly into the
world of meanings and values mediated by legal institutions and legal
practice. Whatever else it is, it is not merely neutral or flatly objective in
some naïve and undifferentiated sense. There is no such thing as a view-

3. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 55 (Houghton
Mifflin 2000) (1918).
4. See the compact but penetrating suggestions by Fred Lawrence in Human Voice and Democratic Political Culture: The Crisis of True Professionalism, 66 TEX. L. REV. 641 (1988).
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pointless viewpoint,
G.K.
5 mChesterton
u c h once wrote, "every education teaches a philosophy; i f
not
l eby sdogma
s then by suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere."
Chesterton
is speaking about the ethos explicitly or implicitly
6
a
communicated
by
v i e w p o any educational system. But what is the specific ethos
communicated
i n t l e sbyslaw school? What is the philosophy that it teaches by
suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere, and perhaps by dogma? And
p
e
d
how does that influence the professionalism that permeates (or is absent
a
g
o
from) the concrete conditions of legal practice? Is it an ethos of justice,
g
y
.
as my colleagues
in the philosophy and theology departments always
Iinitially assume? O r is it something else, perhaps an ethos of technon
cratic or instrumental rationality, which by its restricted terms creates
s sustains
h a kind of reflexive skepticism towards substantive goods or
and
o
r
values?
t
ethos
which
,
eclectically blends technical proficiency, substantive values
7
such
a r as a respect for rights based on a more or less Lockean or Kantian
O
or
viewpoint, combined with a basic agnosticism regarding
is pragmatist
s
any
i t set of ends or goods which claim to somehow eliminate what seems
in
s fact an inelimanable pluralism concerning the ends or goals or purposes
of law?
b
These questions concern perennially complex and contentious isa
sues. While I do not propose to solve them here, I think some perspecs i
tive on these issues can be gleaned by noticing two things. First, we all
cembody or live out of some basic, operative view of the good—a phielosophy in the loose sense—and that includes law professors and practit
tioners!
We choose what we choose for a reason, both individually and
h
collectively, and generally those reasons are embedded in some image or
o
understanding
of a larger moral, social, cultural, or religious order.
s9
s 5. The standard, unconscious response to this statement invites the conclusion that therefore all
viewpoints are simply co-planar. B u t this inference is neither logically required nor empirically
o
plausible.
Onl y i f there were no such thing as development within viewpoints or between viewm
points would it follow that all viewpoints are co-planar. And i f it were the case that all viewpoints
e
are simply co-planar, then the viewpoint that all viewpoints are co-planar would itself be co-planar
with
t the viewpoint that they are not—that is to say, it would be incoherent or self-refuting.
6. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, AS I WAS SAYING: A CHESTERTON READER 179 (Robert Knille
h
ed., William B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1985).
i 7. For a now-classic account of this topic, see Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the
Law
r School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978), especially pages 253-59.
8. See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory,
d27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 65, 65 (1993) ("[R]ecognized or not, philosophy is part of the ordinary life of
tlaw schools and lawyers. Images of the methods of philosophy shape accounts of legal education
and legal reasoning.").
h 9. F or a sophisticated vi ew o f this issue, see CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL
iIMAGWARIEs (Duke Univ. Press 2(n04), especially pages 8-9, ("What an understanding of moral
norder adds to an awareness and acceptance of norms is an identification of features of the world or
g
,
p
e
r
h
a
p
s
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Second, the legal academy is essentially schizophrenic toward
questions of the good.
sionalism
113 O and
n all the other values with which we imbue our students. On
the
t hother
e hand, the basic stance of the Socratic Method, as traditionally
practiced
by law professors, often leaves students with nothing more than
o n e
a
kind
of
h a nresidual,
d ,undifferentiated skepticism. Students become technically
at generating arguments for and against various policy
w proficient
e
claims or value stances, it is true, but the acquisition of this skill often
l
i
k
leaves them stripped of whatever moral common sense they may have
e
possessed when they entered law school." Students may retain personal
t
o
values, but these are essentially privatized, aestheticized, and anaesthet
a
tized. After all, everyone knows that "value judgments" are merely subljective. k
a
Butbwhat "everyone knows" in this context turns out to be a more
o
u
or less unexamined
story or narrative about the absoluteness o f the
t
fact/value
dichotomy—less the product of serious or sustained theoretic
p
r on the
o nature of ethics than a watered-down popular version of
reflection
Hume,
f
eor Nietzsche,
s
or Weber.
12
A l t h o u g h
t haction
e or human
r elife that make certain norms both right and (up to the point indicated) realizdivine
able.
a I n other
r words,
e the image of order carries a definition not only of what is right, but of the
context in which it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right (at least partially).").
m 10. See
a SamuelnJ. Levine,
y Introductory Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values—
r
e to the
a Problems
s of Ethical
o
Responding
Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145, 146 (1998).
11.
Many
law
students
complain
with some frequency that law school makes them feel like
n
s
they have been gutted of the idealism that brought them to law school, or that it makes them feel that
ttheir souls have been
o stripped from them. I had one bright and idealistic student last year who described law school, rather feelingfully, as "a soul-sucking hell-hole." Perhaps that is an extreme
formulation, but a growing body of literature suggests that my student was onto something. See
Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role o f Legal Education i n Producing Psychological Distress
Among Law Students and Lawyers, 11 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 225, 246 (1986) (noting that data
shows law students experience heightened levels of "obsessive-compulsive behavior, interpersonal
sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (social
alienation and isolation)"); Susan Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997); Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871,872-81 (1999), James R. P. Ogloff et al., More Than
"Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:" The Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 73 (2000); Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 114-15
(2002) (referring to a 1990 study by researchers at Johns Hopkins); Angela McCaffrey, The Healing
Presence of Clients in Law School, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 87, 95 (2003) (citing an earlier study
by Sheldon and Krieger); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have
Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-being,
22 BEHAN/. Sa. & L. 261 (2004).
12. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23 ("There are important differences between social imaginary and social theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary
people 'imagine' their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is
carried in images, stories, and legends. i t is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a
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question the received wisdom regarding the fact/value dichotomy," it is
solidly entrenched in the "social imaginary," as Charles Taylor calls it,
which governs legal pedagogy. I n a classic passage, Karl Llewellyn
suggested to first year students that law school "aims, in the old phrase,
to get you 'thinking like a lawyer.' The hardest job of the first year is to
lop off your common sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia.. along with woozy thinking."
14 At any rate, after launching students on their merry way into practice with this suggestion, implication, atmosphere, or dogma (as Chesterton would say), we then expect them to be fine, upstanding members of
the bar: professional, civil, courteous, diligent, honest, and willing to
avoid "offensive personalities" and to swear to "never reject, from any
consideration personal to myself, the cause o f the defenseless or opsmall minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups
of people, i f not the whole society. W hich leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is
that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of
legitimacy.").
13. Here again, the literature is vast, but one might start with HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE
OFTHE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) or the massive
and magisterial CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (Harvard Univ. Press 2007). For a critique of
the fact/value dichotomy from a Marxist perspective of the primacy of praxis, see Louis DUPRE,
MARX'S SOCIAL CRITIQUEOFCULTURE 1-14, 58-108, 276-88 (Yale Univ. Press 1985).
The full historical and philosophical genealogy of this syndrome is extremely complex. T he
problem also goes by the name of "the subject/object split" or "the self/world divide." HUSTON
SMITH, WHY RELIGION MATTERS: THE PATE OF THEHUMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE OF DISBELIEF 256
-57 (HarperCollins 2001). See also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 363 (John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson trans., Blackwell Publ'g 1978) (1927) (critiquing the notion of beginning from "a
worldless '1' in order to provide this ' I' with an Object"); id. at 254 (critiquing the fact that "Descartes, on the contrary, says that cogitationes are present-at-hand, and that in these an ego is presentat-hand too as a worldless res cogirans"). Human being-in-the-world is moral and religious from the
start. See, e.g., ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (Houghton M ifflin 1990);
ROBERT COLES, THE MORALINTELLIGENCEOF CHILDREN (Random House 1997).
Still, progress in understanding these issues does not necessarily depend on successfully ingesting large amounts of arcane philosophical theory. Consider, for example, Richard Mitchell's penetrating and bracing satire i n RICHARD MITCHELL, THE LEANING TOWER OF BABEL AND OTHER
AFFRONTS BY THEUNDERGROUND GRAMMARIAN 128 (Little, Brown 1984) ("But philosophy does
count, even in the most practical matters, especially in the most practical matters. Al l we have to do
to make people ignorant and gullible is persuade them into a silly epistemology.").
14. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 39 (Oceana
Publ'ns 1960) (1930). 1 think Llewellyn's point is fairly obvious: Effective law school pedagogy
requires at a minimum a re-tutoring of the "common sense" with which students enter law school.
Very few people would deny that to become effective practitioners, law students must somehow
learn to think dialectically about their own assumptions, in roughly the manner in which the unfortunate interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues had to learn to re-think the assumptions they happened to
have brought to the dialogue. B ut 1 see little sustained reflection in the legal professoriate on how
such a delicate surgery is best accomplished. Mainly, law professors tend to think that the version of
the Socratic Method modeled by their own professors in law school suffices. Yet the simple expedient of administering a dose of ethical "anesthesia" without the appropriately skillful surgical operation somehow seems less than fully adequate.
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pressed."
students'
"ethics into temporary anesthesia" turns out to be not so tempo15
rary.
Y e t
w eI may appear to be laying a great deal of blame at the door of the
legal
a racademy, when in fact the legal academy largely just reflects the
unconscious
philosophical and cultural assumptions of our time, our gene
eral
"climate
of opinion,"
s o
dichotomy
has
settled into our shared image of moral or cultural or social
I6
m oe u r
order,
"h s oothat
c ifact
a land its questionable value surely have implications for
how
we
envision
landscape involved in the practice of law.
iw m a g i n the
a ethical
r
This
is
an
ancient,
oft-rehearsed
complaint, one around which a vast
ys . u "
literature
has
accreted,
and
one
that
has
been around in one way or anS
t
i
l
l
rotherp since
the time of Plato." Yet any attempt to speak about ethics in a
,r i
legal practice context must take this pedagogical dimension into account.
is e
f
What is desperately needed in legal pedagogy, I would say, is some notd
h
tion of the possibility of fulfillment and flourishing within the practice of
e
w profession. Put differently, what is needed is some possibility of, and
the
fintimation
cof, ant ethos
/ of professionalism, an ethos of justice, an ethos of
h a
ve
a which
l isu not from the start misdirected by a merely instrumental
service,
e
understanding
o f the role and function o f the craft o f lawyering and
n
which
is
not
burdened
and blinkered by a shrunken sense of what law is
t
and
what
lawyers
strive
for in practicing law.
h
e
A BASIC NOTIONOF ETHICS
p
So far I have suggested that legal education and legal practice apr
pear to suffer from something like an ethics deficit or, at least, that they
o
labor under some key unexamined assumptions concerning the very nac
ture of ethics. I have also suggested that the deficit and the assumptions
e
adversely affect the ethos of the profession and that any renewed sense of
sfulfillment and flourishing within the practice of law may depend on a
s
o
WASH. ST. ADMISSION TOPRAC. R. 5(e) (oath of admission to the Washington State Bar).
f 15.
16. The phrase was made famous by Whitehead. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE
kAND THEMODERN WORLD 3 (1925). See also CARL LOTUS BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURYPHILOSOPHERS (Yale Univ. Press 1932), especially chapter one.
n
17. See PLATO, supra note 2. N ote that while the dialogue appears to be about the nature of
o
"oratory" or "rhetoric," it is (in part) really about the defective educational schemes and orientations
cof the ancient Greek professionals who aimed to help their students acquire "the ability to convince
by means of speech a jury in a court of justice," id. at *452, and the ability "to produce the kind of
kconviction needed in courts of law," id. at *454, and it concerns the proper or improper "use of oraitory, like people in the law courts," id. at *471. A n adequate reading of the Gorgias requires one to
read
n it as a Greek drama, not just a source for conceptual or logical contents. See also James Boyd
White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849,
g
872 (1983) ("Indeed, i f what Socrates says about ancient rhetoric and its practitioners is true, how
can it not be equally true of modem law and modem lawyers?").
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broader and deeper notion of ethics than the one normally and tacitly
assumed in legal education. Now let me briefly sketch the rudiments that
I believe comprise such a broader and deeper notion.
What is ethics about? In its most compact and basic form, ethics is
about three things. First, it is about the deep human longing for what one
can only call orientation. This longing is "deeper and more fundamental
than sexuality, deeper than the craving for social power, deeper even
than the desire for possessions"; it is a "more generalized and universal
craving in the human makeup. I t is the craving for knowledge of the
right direction—for orientation."
18 Second, ethics is about self-transcendence or, as the philosopher
Iris Murdoch once phrased it, ethics is about overcoming "the fat relentless ego."
which
the "high world religions" have struggled to convey to their folI9
lowers
T h i for
s centuries.
not
difficult
to see a connection between ethics and religious faith. A s
20
I
f
i s
she
notes,
M
a u r d o c h
im Moral
so philosophy is properly, and in the past sometimes has been,
e
e
of this ego and of the techniques ( if any) for its der the
ev discussion
feat.
I
n
this
respect
moral philosophy has shared some aims with
n
f o
religion.
To
say
this
is
of course also to deny that moral philosophy
a
p p r o
r m
should
aim
at
being
neutra1.
xi di m a t
21 y
e
ethics is centrally about the fact that humans constitute
a lbThird,
themselves
byg their deliberations, decisions, and actions. We are in the
rl e i
habit
oft saying, that we "made a decision," but it is more accurate to say
h
t
that
make us. B y choosing various objects or courses of
ta our decisions
h
action,
we
cumulatively
constitute ourselves as genuine or fraudulent,
e
n
s
authentic
or
inauthentic,
human
beings.
ik
22
tt
ih 18. SMITH, supra note 13, at 26 (quoting psychologist William Sheldon). See also the comment
by
sa the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan: "[M]an's deepest need and most prized
possession is authenticity." BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 254 (The Seabury Press
n1979) (1972).
o 19. Iris Murdoch, On ' God' and 'Good,' in REVISIONS: CHANGINGPERSPECTIVES IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 68,72 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Macintyre eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1983)
n
("In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego.").
e 20. See Friederich Heiler, The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of
Religions, in THE HISTORYOF RELIGIONS: ESSAYS IN METHODOLOGY 142,143-44 (Mircea Eliade &
m
Joseph M. Kitagawa eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1959); see generally SMITH, supra note 13.
i 21. Murdoch, supra note 19, at 72-73.
g 22. Note that I did not use the pair, "successful or unsuccessful." A n adequate critique of the
consumerist ideology implicit in the standard notion (or "social imaginary") of "success" in Amerih culture would perhaps require the interdisciplinary talents of Charles Taylor. For a start, though,
can
tseeMARTHA BANTA, FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN AMERICA: A LITERARY DEBATE (Princeton Univ.
Press 1978); WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS,POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW
t
h
i
n
k
,
o
n
e

Seattle University Law Review
Notice that, if these three notions are as fundamental as I suggest,
ethics is not primarily concerned with concepts or with rules. Instead, it
is primarily concerned with the proper negotiation of a basic tension
within human consciousness that is lived but not necessarily explicitly or
focally noticed. A s beings capable of and called to self-transcendence,
we are in permanent tension, precariously poised between the selves that
we are and the selves that we could or should be. As Aristotle observed,
most humans will what is noble, but choose what is advantageous.
as
23Bernard
O r Lonergan notes, "self-transcendence involves tension between the self as transcending and the self as transcended. S o human
authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession. I t is
ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal
only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals.'924
An approach to ethics centered on the three fundamental notions I
described improves on the standard model or paradigm of ethics by highlighting a number o f important features o f ethical understanding and
practice. First, this approach to ethics is practical. One need not solve
all the protean theoretic quandaries of ethics, historicity, pluralism, relativism, anti-relativism, foundationalism, or anti-foundationalism in order
to make progress as an ethical human being any more than one need
know the physics of acceleration in order to drive faster on the freeway.
One need not know the fine points of the theory of subatomic particles in
order to avoid driving into macroscopic objects like telephone poles.
And one need not solve all the aporia of theoretical ethics in order to
make proximate and genuine progress in living a good or choiceworthy
life.
Second, ethics primarily concerns one's orientation in life. The basic unit of ethics is not the concept, the rule, or the dilemma; rather, it is
us and what we make of us. Not only do we cumulatively constitute ourselves, but each choice or decision we make shifts the probabilities of
future choices or decisions—not only for ourselves, but also for the institutions within which we work and liv e.
25
AMERI CAN CULT URE ( P a n t h e o n B o o k s 1 9 9 3 ) ; I . J . J A CK S O N L E A R , N o P LA CE O F G RA CE :
ANT 1MO DERNI SM A ND T HE T RANSF O RMAT I O N OF A M E RI CA N CULT URE 1 8 8 0
-cago Press 1994), especially pages 97-140.
1920
( U n i v .
o
f
C
h
i
-

23. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *
eds., 1998).
11621) 35 ( D a v i d
24.
R See
o LONERGAN,
s s ,supra note 18, at 110.
25.
See
ARISTOTLE,
supra note 23, at *1114b30-1115a3 ("[Wje are in control of our actions
J
.
from beginning
L
.to end, insofar as we know the particular circumstances surrounding them. But we
control
of
the particular steps in their development are imperA onlyc the beginning
k
r
i ourl characteristics:
l
c ept ible . . . . " ) ; 1 B E RNA RD LO NERG AN, CO LLECT ED W O RKS OF BERNARD iO NERG AN, G RACE AND

&
.
Press J1988) ("The human
will does not swing back to a perfect equilibrium of indifference with
a
U
r
m
s
o
n
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Third, while this way of conceiving ethics leaves room for religiously based self-transcendence, faith is not a magic wand. L ik e anything good, faith can be prostituted, domesticated, distorted, or turned
into something evil. F o r though religious faith can produce extraordinary flowerings of human excellence, such as Francis of Assisi, Teresa
of Avila, Dorothy Day, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, the Dalai Lama, it
can also serve as a vehicle by which "the fat relentless ego" confuses
itself with God in a condition traditionally known as spiritual pride and
traditionally regarded as one of the greatest evils. Historical and contemporary instances of "the many traps of religious aberration"
ficiently
to allow me to dispense with a bill of particu2b
a r efamiliar,
s u I fthink,
lars.
Fourth, unless one is a rationalist individualist, the project of becoming ethical is not an isolated, atotnistic process.
on
28 ethics,
W eas though
d owe were
n Robinson
o t Crusoe stranded on s oi
island
of
the
moral
world.
To
he
contrary, ethical reflection is inevitably
-r e fl e c t
ne d e s e r t
every tick of the clock; its past operations determine its present orientation, and though this orientation has not , absolute fixity .....St111 it is ebaracterized by the relative fixity of psychological eon- t i n u i t y . " ) ; Patr i ck Byr ne, O n T aki ng 'Responsibility f a r t h e Indeterminate Futur e, i n
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN DESTINY: CURRENT CONTINENTAL
RESEARCHES 228-38 (Stephen Skousgaard ed,, LiniV_ Press of Am, 1980 ("To take responsibility
within the real universe, within a UniVerSC Whose future is indeterminate, we must assume responsi
bility
for the shifts in probabilities which result from our actions.").
.
-- 2 6 , See LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 110. •
- 2 7 . 1 would note that religious experience and development, like all human development, is
dialectical. S e e , e. g, BERNARD LONERGAN, Theology i n Its New Context, i n A SECOND
COLLECTION 67 (William F. Ryan and Bernard I Tyrrell eds., Westminster Press 0974) Cl[F]or
religion is conversion in its preparation, in its occurrence, in its devolopnlent, i ' i
also,
its
its disintegration."). I would also note
t S alas,
c o inn its
s incompleteness,
e q u e n t s ,its failures,
a
n breakdowns,
d
that the stock reductionist assumption that religion is best understood as infantile or neurotic guilt mongering Seems rather empirically4t Odds aivith the r eal" I eligiously-inSpired is in dev el opment„
- A s in other domains, so on in the domain of religion, infantile feats can outlast the time
of their inevitability. They can color or pervade or dominate in religious feelings of guilt.
But it does not at once follow, and it is not at once to be atsurned, that such fears retire' sent religious maturity and not religious retardation. One cannot simply ignore the fact
that, as religious people advance in the life of the spirit, fear gives place to love, and the
terrors of guilt yield to shame for one's lack of responsibill1y and sorrow for one's lack of
love.
17 BERNARD LON ER
LONERGAN,
PHILOSOPHICALAND THEOLOGICALPAPERS: 1 9 6 5
Robert
-GAN , Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 2004),
of individualism, see Patrick Brown, Overcoming 'Inhumanly Inept'
S 9a8 c28.
1
0 ,r On
aalthe
i t zvarious
a 2t 6 forms
2
Structures:
Catholic
Social
Thought
an 'Subsidiarity and the critique of Bureaucracy, Law, and
-i o n
Culture,
a 3 n 2( J. CATH.
6
R
d o Soc.
b THOUGHT
e r t 413,41&-I9 (2005) Rationalist individualism is simply a form
of epistetnic individualism; its basic presupposition is that the significant locus of human knowing is
, t er c e u le a k
C
e
n
the individual rather than the community, the group, or the tradition. See id
r i z a t i o
&
n ,
i
n
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embedded in a tradition, even if it is only the tradition implicit in the language one speaks.
29 the
A justifications
s
of our moral principles and assertions cannot be
S t done
a nfrom
l ethe
y point of view of anyone, but rather [require] a tradiH tion
a uof moral
e r wisdom. Such a tradition is not a 'deposit' of unw changing
a s moral 'truth,' but it is made up of the lives of men and
n women
o
twho are constantly testin
through
.
e
d
, their own struggle to live it.
i°
g otherwise,
a n d ethics and becoming ethical are at least partly matters
Stated
of reasonable
belief.
c h a n
g i n g
t
h
a
t
AND A PLURALISM OF ENDS
t r FOUR
a LEVELS
d i tOF HAPPINESS
i o
nLet me now flesh out the basic notions of ethics—orientation, selftranscendence, and self-making or self-constituting—by discussing a
model that can help us understand the relation of religion, ethics, pluralism, and the law in a way that is both concrete and salutary. The model
is a descriptive heuristic. I t is not an abstract, necessitarian ethical doctrine, concept, or set of premises. Rather, it forms an instance of what
Richard Bernstein has termed "engaged fallibilistic pluralism."
Bernstein
31 A snotes, "Such a pluralistic ethos places new responsibilities on
each of us. For it means taking our own fallibility seriously—resolving
that however much we are committed to our own styles of thinking, we
are willing to listen to others without denying or suppressing the other-

29. On tradition as an ineliminable component o f ethical reflection, see ALASDAIR C.
MACI NT YRE, AF T ER VI RT UE: A ST UDY I N M O RA L T HEO RY ( D u c k w o r t h 1985) , es pec ially c hapt er

one (discussing the linguistic dimension o f ethical traditions), and ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE,
WHOSEJUSTICE?WHICH RATIONALITY? (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1989).
30. Stanley Hauerwas, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in REVISIONS, CHANGING
PERspEcrivEs IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 19, at 33.
31. RI CHA RD J. BERNST EI N, T HE NE W CO NST ELLAT I O N: T HE E T H I C A L
OFMODERNITY/POST-MODERNITY
336 (MIT Press 1992). The fallibilistic thesis is not entirely new
PO LI T I CAL
H O R I Z O N S
or uniquely post-modem; without glossing over the vast differences in historical context, it is fair to
say that both Aristotle and Aquinas (among other philosophers) made similar points. S e e
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *
(a
1 0well-oriented
9 4 1 ) 2 3 person "is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which
the
- nature of the subject at hand admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability
2 8 from
( Ma mathematician
a r t i nas to demand strict demonstration from an orator"); THOMAS AQUINAS,
COMMENTARY
O s t wON ARISTOTLE'S
a l d NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 18 ( CI. Litzinger trans., Regnery 1964)
("[Ciertitude cannot be found, nor should it be sought, in the same degree in all discussions where
t
r
a
n
s
.
,
we reason about anything. Likewise, the same method is not used in all products made by art; but
B
o
b
b
s
each workman works with the material in a way suited to that material N o w the matter of moral
M
r a nature
i l that
l perfect certitude is not suitable to i t") ; id. ("Thus i t is evident that
study eis ofr such
P
u are variable
b and divergent, not having the same certitude each time.").
moral matters
.
1
9
6
2
)
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ness of the other."
which
32 T might
h e allow us to think critically about the plurality of ends for
which
m o humans
d e l strive, including religious ends, and about the relations
between
h
a them.
s
It
d e has
s cto do,
r in other words, with that rare achievement of selftranscendence,
i p t i v orientation, and self-constituting called self-knowledge.
eSelf-knowledge is not exactly irrelevant to ethics, legal education, or professional practice. Indeed, for a professional formation process, claiming
a
n
Socrates as the inspiration for its pedagogical method, to lack any comd
ponent of self-knowledge would be, well, an injustice.
d iTheathreel basic features of ethics I have been discussing find illuse
c in ta descriptive
i
tration
model articulated in Robert Spitzer's work on
cbusiness
a ethics.
l
n
plications.
model is simply a skeletal structure of the pluralism
33
I t u Spitzer's
i s
a
n
of
human
ends,
goals,
and purposes. I t is verifiable in personal experie l e g a
cnence
and
e
confirmed,
in
various ways, by the historical traditions of phit
silosophy
n and by the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism,
and other world religions.
i
t
Essentially, Spitzer contends that humans operate on, and are ori34
s
ented towards, four distinct but related levels of happiness. Each successsivei level
m embodies
p
an increased increment o f self-transcendence, an
l i c i
enlargement or deepening of orientation, and a higher stage in the selftconstituting
y
inherent in ethical reflection and decision. O n a first level,
awe are spontaneously oriented to the kind of happiness that comes from
n
d
32. BERNsTE1N, supra note 31, at 336. Again, this notion is not entirely new. See ARISTOTLE,
fsupra a
note 23,sat *1134b-1135a; AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 18 ("Regarding [virtuous works] there
care no agreed
i
nopinions, but rather a decided difference is found in what men judge about them. I n
athis matter,
t ai variety of errors occur, for certain actions, considered just and good by some, are
looked upon as unjust and bad by others according to different times and places and persons. N ow a
ndeed isgconsidered vicious at one time and in one country, but at a different time and in a different
icountry it is not considered to be so."); AUGUSTINE, TEACHING CHRISTIANITY 144 (New City Press
1995) ("All good and true Christians should understand that truth, wherever they may find it, benlongs to their God.").
i
33. RO BERT J. SPITZER, T HE SPIRIT OF LEADERSHI P: OPTIMIZING CREAT I VI T Y AND CHANG E IN
ORGANIZATIONS
75-124 (Executive Excellence Publ'g 2000).
t
34. Because it is, broadly speaking, emergentist rather than reductionist, Spitzer's model is
scontrary to the philosophy-disguised-as-science known as "scientism" and its corollary reductioniism. For a critique of scientism from the point of view of the history of religions, see SMITH, supra
note 13, especially chapters 1-4 and chapters 8-14. F or a rigorous philosophical critique of scienm
t ism, see I O ERI C VO EG ELI N, T he O r igins o f Scient ism, i n CO LLECT ED W O RKS OF ERI C VO EG ELI N,
-PUBLISHED ESSAYS: 1940-1952, at 168-96 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Univ. of Miss. Press 2000). F or a
rigorous critique o f reductionism, see chapters three and four i n 3 BERNARD LONERGAN,
CO LLECT ED W O RKS O F B E RNA RD LO NERG AN, I NSI G HT : A S T UDY OF H U M A N UNDERST ANDI NG

(Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 1992) (discussing the worldview of "emergent probability" as a necessary consequence of the complementarity of classical and
statistical heuristic structures in modem science).
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immediate gratification. Examples abound, of course, but one can think
of basic aesthetic pleasures such as chocolate, lattes, wine, music, poetry,
painting, laughter, and other more or less immediate sources of various
kinds of pleasure. O n a second level, we are spontaneously oriented to
the kind of happiness that comes from ego-gratification. Again, examples are many, but one can think of the happiness that comes from personal achievement, successful competition, social recognition, and honor.
On a third level, we are spontaneously oriented to the kind of happiness that comes from contributing to some good beyond oneself. Here
one can think of the kind of happiness that comes from being a member
of a community, whether it be a friendship, relationship, or marriage; a
team, a working group, or a group with specialized skills and aims, such
as a scholarly community; or a local, national, or international social or
cultural community Mak ing a contribution to a good beyond oneself
involves a distinct form of happiness or experienced fulfillment, different
in kind and not essentially reducible to immediate or ego-gratification.
Such a contribution involves us in self-transcending affects such as gratitude, friendship,
35 aOn
n adfourth level, we are spontaneously oriented to the kind of happiness
or fulfillment that comes from being involved with something of
a
ultimate
According to Spitzer, humans "are not only inters e n significance.
s e
ested
in
what
is
concrete
and immediate, they want to be involved in
o
f
something
c o m ofmultimate, permanent, absolute, unconditional, and even infinite
I t is not enough to experience a concrete truth. We
u n significance.
i t
would like to have a sense of ultimate Truth."
y
36
i s
i fulfillment
s
t that
h people
e
levelTof hhappiness
or
of faith associate with living
o
d i practicing
and
s t i ntheir
c faith.
t i v e
rgressive enlargements o f the horizon of the particular individual who
37 O n e
b
e l
experiences
c a n them.
o nThis gis all simple enough, and volumes more could be, and have
t h i n k
ibeen,
n written
g about each level. The levels are themselves multi-leveled,
o
f
. each is less like a simple discrete category and more like an inner
and
t
h
e
s
e
35. One can correlate these levels with various accounts of virtue. The relationship of friendfship to ethics
o and political
u community, for example, is part of the classical tradition in philosophical
and
r theological ethics. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at *1155a-1172a (on the relation of
friendship to ethics); see also DONALD X. BURT, FRIENDSHIPAND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
lAUGUSTINE'S
e PRACTICAL
v
e
PHILOSOPHY (William B. Eerdmans Publ'g 1999).
l 36.sSPITZER, supra note 33, at 81. T he most helpful scholarly introductions to the fourth level
that
a I am aware of include the article by Friedrich Heiler, supra note 20, and chapter 4 on "Religion"
in LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 101-24.
s 37. Chapter 4 on "Religion" in LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 101-24, also provides a much
more
and dialectical account of the fourth level. See also PAUL WOODRUFF,
p ample, nuanced,
r
REVERANCE:RENEWING A FORGOTTEN VIRTUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
o
-
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continent. The scheme has many precedents in the history of philosophy,
notably Kierkegaard's delineation of three levels of existential subjectivity: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
possesses
38 Y e at descriptive
S p i clarity
t z e that
r 'other
s models of the different traditions
of
philosophical
ethics
can
lack.
m
o
d
e
l
This clarity gives the model a unique relevance for the problem of
pluralism in ethics, for it anchors ethical discernment in the concrete and
verifiable experience of the individual person without holding ethics hostage to a superficial relativism or skepticism. I t helps the individual
identify the normative dynamics of self-transcendence already present
within her own experience without simply imposing a doctrinaire set of
extrinsic rules or concepts. I n other words, the analytic power of Spitzer's model stems from (1) its open-textured minimalism, which is open
to a large plurality of concrete and even conflicting understandings, (2)
its description of the relation of the levels to one another, and (3) its implications for what Iris Murdoch holds is the subject of ethics, namely,
the overcoming or transcendence of the ego. I will discuss each of these
advantages in turn.
First, the model does not presuppose any particular scheme of evaluating or valorizing the four levels of happiness as levels. Each level is
simply a spontaneous orientation that has to be guided forward by appropriate developments and differentiations. Each is open and thus pluralist;
in other words, each is open to all the variant understandings of different
cultural or historical traditions. F o r example, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Confucianism, and Islam conceive of the third and fourth levels in different way s ,
third
39 level in different ways.
Second, the descriptive-evaluative component comes from the relaa n d
tions
the levels. According to Spitzer, taken together, the levels
u t ibetween
l i
are
integral.
Not
only are they levels of happiness to which we are spont a r i
taneously
oriented,
they are levels of personal identity as well. Thus, one
a n i s
has
m an aesthetic identity, an ego identity, a contributive identity, and an
identity based on the degree of one's affective and effective orientation
a
into transcendent mystery. The higher levels incorporate or sublate but
n
do not replace the lower levels. Each level has its own distinctive role or
d
function,
and the functioning of the higher levels complements and comc o and contextualizes the lower levels. B y the same token, i f the
pletes
m mlevels are truncated or ignored, the lower levels become distorted
higher
u n i
t a r
38. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, EITHER/OR: A FRAGMENT OF LIFE (George L. Strengren trans.,
i a L. Ross
n ed., Harper & Row 1986) (1843).
Steven
i s39. See, e.g., WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CONFUCIAN COMMUNITAIUAN PERSPECTIVE 5 8
m
8c9 ( H a r v a r d
U
o n i v .
P
n r e s s
1
9
9
8
)
.
c
e
i
v
e
o

308 S e a t t l e University Law Review

[Vol. 32:293

versions of themselves. An orientation to pleasure or ego achievement is
one thing in the context of the full spectrum of happiness; it is another
thing, however, i f the sublating orientations implicit in the third and
fourth levels are ignored or denied.
• T h u s , i f 1 acknowledge (and therefore live on or out of) only the
first two levels, my psychic center will be off-center. F or from within
-this truncated stance, on the psychological level,
I tend to locate my center in myself I act as if ' were the hub of the
world and I intend (direct myself) toward all other things and persons from that central place. A l l others are seen from this vantage point. A l l others are evaluated from this standard. A ll others
are means to my ends as praarnatie goals of my free subjectivity
. All others are enjoyed depending on the value of their qualities to
s a t i s f y my needs as an organic and psychological consumerS
-cdsatisfaction of
vf"g
e
th
n
ry,o
la
im
needs, rather than bringing happiness, tends to be greedy and addictive,
an indulgence that becomes decadent, repulsive to others, and selfdestnictived'
4 level of knowing, rny ego-centered intelligence, rather than underthe
standing
others, tends to be arrogant and obsessive, self-righteous in
'
judgments
i v l o r e of others and defensive against their calling my ego into questiond'
ov er ,
42
e vThis downwardly-directed dynamic o f selft-tmneation and self- ealienation
is also illustrated by Spitzer's extended analysis of what he
n
calls
m 'the comparison game,”
cies
occur when one's identity and search for happiness stalls on the sec43
y w h o s e
ond
level.
I tn athencomparison
si p
e o u game, everything one does is centered on
n ot n
whether
it
enhances
his or her comparative advantage or comparative
se l l y l i
ranking
vis-a-visr others.
d
u cSpitzer devotes an entire chapter to analyzing
gthe pervasive
ee ns t and
destructive
effects that this has on organizational effectc ie v e
tiveness and esprit de cotps. While I cannot enter into a detailed discustw
e
n
d
sion of that here, I would suggest that his analysis of the comparison
e
n
igame provides a remarkable diagnostic technique for evaluating the pal
l
40. GEORGE KUNZ, THE PARADOX OF POWER AN WEAKNESS: LEVINAS AND AN
sALTERNATIVEPARADIGM OF PSYCHOLOGY 110 (State Univ. of Ni.ʻ(. Press 1998). Although Kunz is
unot drawing on Spitzer's model, his account is remarkably consonant with it. As a Levinasian psychologist, Kunz's description of the Gyges Complex, the Zeus Complex, and the Narcissus Complex
ffits hand-in-glove with Spitzer's description of the pathologies that can occur when the third and
ffourth levels of happiness/identity get ignored, displaced, or occluded. Similarly, the whole postmodern emphasis on the Other fills out and concretizes what Spitzer means by the third level.
e 41.M at 111.
r 42. Id at 110.
d 43.i SPITZER, supyra note 8 9 - 1 2 3 .
s
t
o
r
t
i
o
n
:
"
A
t
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thologies that haunt law schools and law firms. I n addition, Spitzer's
analysis has remarkable affinities with Rene Girard's notion of "mimetic
rivalry?'" Girard's analysis identifies envy as a central form of distorted
human desire for the good and for happiness, and one simply cannot
adequately discuss the central problem of ethics—the "ego and t h e
techniques (if any) for its d e f e a f '
4 5 This destructive dynamic of the comparison game, then, is precisely
what
— w plays
i t h o itself
u t out for students in law school and lawyers in law firms.
When
i d e I nteach
t i Spitzer's
f y i n text
g in my ethics course, law students immediately
recognize
it
as
naming
and describing with remarkable accuracy
t
h
e
s
e
one
o
f
the
things
they
find
most
difficult and painful about the law
d y n a m i c
school
s . experience. Similarly, lawyers in practice recognize the comparison game as one of the main pathologies stalking the contemporary practice of law.
Stated otherwise, while Spitzer's model identifies the normative
dynamics implicit in the human quest for happiness on each of the four
different levels, it also leaves room for diagnosing the biases that may
attend each level. A n exclusive orientation to the first and second levels
can leave a person the victim of a conscious or unconscious egoistic bias
which makes the individual self and its interests the manipulative center
of everything. Similarly, an orientation to the good beyond oneself can
become arrested by the group bias of the relevant community. Finally,
the orientation to both the common good and to transcendent faith can be
distorted by the biases of the lower levels and may even intensify them.
The levels of happiness can also become captured by cultural biases. The hypertrophic individualism of American culture tends to make
the third level seem implausible; the reflexive skepticism of law school
culture guts the possibilities of higher orientation offered by both the
third and fourth levels; and human living then settles down into a decadent routine o f competing egos struggling for status and recognition.
The resulting situation in legal practice is not exactly conducive to either
professionalism or an ethos of justice. Mainly, it is conducive to making
the world of legal practice seem pretty much like Hobbes' description of
pre-civil society as "the war of all against all.”
46

44. See, e.g., RENE GIRARD, A THEATER OF ENVY: WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Oxford Univ.
Press 1991); see also chapter 3 in EUGENE WEBB, THE SELF BETWEEN:FROM FREUD TO THENEW
SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY OF FRANCE (Univ. of Wash. Press 1993), describing Girard's treatment of
"mimetic rivalry."
45. See Murdoch, On 'God' and 'Good,' supra note 19, at 72.
46. THOMAS HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier 1962) (1651).
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V. CONCLUSION
All of this is perhaps simply a way of saying that the ethical and religious horizons of law students should not simply be ignored, anesthetized, or—by implication, atmosphere, or dogma—denied or denigrated
by legal education. Legal education should cultivate an ethos of justice
and not just technical proficiency in legal mechanics. N o r should we
ignore the resources that faith or ethics in the form of orientation, selftranscendence, and self-constituting might offer in the struggle against
the deformation of professionalism in the practice of law.
47 indeed
are
W h "many
i l e traps
t hof ereligious
r e aberration,"
nore
the
fact
that
developed
forms
of religious self-transcendence (that is
48 w e c a n n o t
to
hostage
s say,
i those
m pwhich
l yare not merely
i
g
-to or captured by the first two
levels of happiness) contribute to the possibility of liberation from egocompulsion and make possible increased contributions to a common
good.
In other words, because genuine religious faith has the potential to
partially dethrone or displace "the fat relentless ego," it can inspire sustained self-transcendence in the service of justice; it can work for the
betterment of humankind in all sorts of concrete and sustained ways—
even in the face of seemingly hopeless odds; and it can help make life in
the practice of law something other than a Hobbsean "war of all against
all," or a Girardian nightmare of mimetic rivalry, 49 or a Sartrean world in
which "hell is other lawyers."" Genuine religious faith opposes warring
egoisms, resists the hell of an envy-based and ego-built world. I t can
contribute to turning life right-side-up again; it can help us to do and to
become something other than "the complete opposite o f what we
ought."
51

47. See Lawrence, supra note 4. See also Debra Cassens Weis, Narcissists with Big Egos Lead
Many Law Firms, Consultant Says, A B A JOURNAL, Nov. 11, 2008, httm//www.abajoumal.
coin/news/narcissists with_big_egos jead_many Jaw_firms_consultant_saysi.
48. See LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 110.
49. See EUGENE WEBB, supra note 44.
50. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, N o EXIT 52 (Paul Bowles trans., Samuel French 1958) (1944)
("Hell is just—other people.").
51. See PLATO, supra note 2, at *481. For an extraordinary evocation of the power of faith to
mitigate or reverse social evils, see the materials (especially the videos) on the 2008 Opus Prize
winners, Marguerite Barankitse, Krishnammal Jagannathan, and Michael Woodard, available at:
http://www.seattleu.edu/opusprizei.

